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Foreword 
 
  Ever since the Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958) came to prevail 
in finance literature arguing the total irrelevance of the financial structure 
for real decisions,1 economists have progressively adjusted their positions. 
In fact, with the advent of the economics of information and incentives it 
has been possible to demonstrate that, removing the “heroic” hypotheses of 
Modigliani and Miller (M-M), the choice of the forms of financing (internal 
sources, bank loans, issue of bonds and shares) does, by contrast, prove 
relevant for production  and investment decisions. 
  In particular the contributions by Myers (1984), Myers-Majluf 
(1984) and Fazzari-Hubbard-Petersen (1988) laid the foundations for the 
study of firm financing hierarchies and opened the way to the so-called 
pecking order theory. According to this approach the sources of financing 
are not perfect substitutes, one as good as another; rather, firms follow a 
hierarchic order in their use. Indeed, in more recent works the profitability 
of investments itself is no longer assumed as a datum, but the actions and 
choices of managers and the allocation of powers of control are recognised 
to have effect on the value of the firm2 (Hart, 2001; Hall, 2002; Kaplan-
Stromberg, 2002). 
  In this paper we look to the pecking order literature with the aim 
of analysing how it can and should be reconsidered for the study of 
innovative firm financing. Of course, firms of this description operate in the 
high-tech sector (applied to electronics, biotechnology, communications, 
etc.) and so have peculiar characteristics that set them largely apart from 
the traditional firms (Antonelli-Teubal, 2006). These differences have led 
                                                          
1 As well-known, Modigliani and Miller assumed absence or uniformity in fiscal regimes 
regarding business incomes and the existence of perfect capital markets, i.e. complete, 
symmetrical availability of information. In this way it became in principle possible to have 
unlimited access to funds, and at certain and constant cost. 
2The financial structure proves relevant from the macroeconomic as well as 
microeconomic point of view. In this connection see, for example: Gertler (1988); Mayer 
(1990); King-Levine (1993); Rajan-Zingales (1998); Fisman-Love (2003). 
to considering new forms of financing adopting the system of private 
equity. It follows, therefore, that while the pecking order approach remains 
valid, it needs to be modified to take account of the importance that private 
equity in general, and venture capital in particular, have taken on for the 
development of innovation (Berger-Udell, 1998; Bergemann-Hege, 1998; 
Gompers-Lerner, 1998; Kortum-Lerner, 2000; Audretsch-Lehamann, 
2002).  
  The paper is structured thus: in section 1 we look to analysis of 
capital market imperfections to account for the relevance of financing 
hierarchies for the “traditional” firms; in section 2 critical analysis is made 
of the issues connected with the financing of innovation; in section 3 we 
consider the importance and effects that venture capital has for innovative 
firms; finally, in section 4, we analyse pecking order distinguishing 
between the various firms’ phases of development. 
 
 
1. Capital market imperfections and financing hierarchies  
 
  As noted in the foreword, analysis of the presence of financial 
constraints for investment decisions has been an object of study and debate 
ever since the 1950s. It was, however, only in the 1980s that, thanks to 
what is known as the economics of information and incentives, the 
relevance of the financial structure for real decisions has made itself felt, at 
both the theoretical and the empirical level (cf. Gertler, 1988). By bringing 
the focus to bear on environments characterised by imperfect3, 
asymmetrical information between managers-entrepreneurs (insiders) and 
investors-financers of various types (outsiders), we have in fact been able 
to put behind us the famous M-M theorem of the irrelevance of the 
financial structure. In reality, long before the revolution brought about by 
the economics of information, given the “ideal” hypotheses it rested on the 
M-M theorem has always been treated with a degree of scepticism by 
financial agents: an elegant theoretical abstraction devoid of practical 
utility.  
   Regardless of tax regimes (which on the one hand provide for 
deductible financial charges and on the other hand apply differentiated 
taxation to returns on dividends and capital gains4), abandoning the 
hypothesis of perfect capital markets opened the way to a great many 
contributions arguing against the perfect substitutability of sources of 
financing (inside sources, bank credit, issue of bonds and shares). A good 
proportion of this literature, whether at the level of “corporate finance” or 
“economics”, has demonstrated the existence of a well-established financial 
hierarchy in the sources of financing for firms,5 on the basis of which 
internal sources are to be preferred to bank credit, which in turn is favoured 
above the direct issue of shares. 
  The pioneering contributions by Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
particularly by Fazzari-Hubbard-Petersen (1988) laid the foundations for 
construction of the “stepped” finance supply curve of firms (Cf. Fazzari-
Hubbard-Petersen, 1988, p. 156, Fig.1), which brings into evidence the 
traditional hierarchy in firms’ finance sources.  
The internal sources, consisting mainly in cash-flow (internal net-worth) , 
are preferred to bank credit since their use does not entail the agency costs 
deriving from the asymmetry of information, whether ex-ante or ex-post,6 
between managers-entrepreneurs and investors-financers. Resorting to 
external financing (through credit) thus proves more costly than drawing 
upon internal sources7 precisely because there is a lemon premium to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 Imperfect ex-post observability of the actions taken on by insiders. 
4In many industrialised countries the tax regime penalises income deriving from dividends 
as compared with capital-gains. 
5The idea of the pecking order is in contrast with the static trade-off approach (for 
comparison see Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). The latter has it that firms aim at 
determining the optimal financial structure (shown with optimal leverage), which is 
obtained when the marginal benefits in terms of tax saving associated with credit are 
counterbalanced by the marginal costs of bankruptcy. 
6As well-known, reference is to the moment the financing contract is drawn up: when ex-
ante information asymmetry gives rise to the problem of adverse selection, when ex-post 
to the problem of moral hazard or a cost for verification of the state of the investment plan 
(costly state verification). 
7The opportunity cost involved in insider financing is equal to the interest rate forming on 
the money market. On the basis of the marginal condition for investment if the firm draws 
on outsider investment, the productivity of the capital will have to amount to the sum of 
the monetary interest rate (including the lemon premium), the cost associated with 
depreciation and any marginal adjustment costs there may be (Hall, 2002); this means that 
the cost of drawing on outsider sources is higher than when using insider sources. As we 
have seen, the lemon premium is higher in the case of direct issue of shares than for bank 
credit. 
reckoned with (Akerlof, 1970). Observing Fig.1 it will be seen that the cost 
of such financing proves growing in the degree of debt (leverage) given the 
principle of lender’s increasing risk (Kalecki, 1937); in fact, as the ratio 
between internal and external sources increases, so does the risk of 
bankruptcy. Thus, the higher the level of indebtedness, or the lower the 
value of highly liquid assets or inside collateral8 given in guarantee, the 
greater will be the marginal cost involved in bank financing. Should the 
bank decide, on screening, to ration credit to the firm in question totally, 
then the rising part of the supply curve would become completely vertical 
and the level of investment would then depend entirely on the inside 
resources. 
  In turn, bank credit proves preferable to the direct issue of shares 
for two reasons basically:  
1) the banks are able to apply screening and delegated monitoring directly 
to the firms: this reduces the degree of information asymmetry, thereby 
minimising the agency cost of outsider financing ( Diamond, 1984);  
2) in an environment of imperfect, asymmetrical information the credit 
agencies take on the function of producing information (Stiglitz, 1985; 
Stiglitz-Weiss, 1988), which has indirect positive effects on the very value 
of the firms financed. In fact, obtaining a loan often entails an increase in 
share prices (James, 1987; Bayless-Chaplinsky, 1990; Alam-Walton, 1995; 
Jong-Veld, 2001) since, by the very fact of obtaining financing, the firms’ 
reputation is enhanced to the eyes not only of clients and suppliers, but also 
of other potential investors-financers (Diamond, 1991). 
  The direct issue of shares (public equity), on the other hand, 
usually triggers a dip in their price, precisely because it is perceived by the 
investors-financers as a signal that the managers-entrepreneurs hold the 
firm to be overvalued, or even as an indication that the firm is unable to 
obtain financing: this in turn implies that the investment plans the firm 
intends to finance are of the riskiest nature. This complex picture 
characterising the finance markets was accounted for by Myers-Majluf 
(1984) as in all cases starting from consideration of an environment marked 
                                                          
8Distinction is made between inside and outside collaterals. The former consist of capital 
goods or highly liquid assets in the possession of the firm, while the latter are a matter of 
by information asymmetry between managers and potential shareholders. 
the latter interpret an issue of shares as “bad news” since they know that 
the managers, holding part of the shares, act in the interests of the 
shareholders and are reluctant to issue new shares on account of the dilution 
of the capital that would ensue.  
  Apart from the agency costs due to information asymmetry, we 
must also bear in mind that the issue of shares entails in addition 
appreciable direct costs (rating, publicity and certification, placement costs) 
which make this by far and away the most costly form of financing. A firm 
will therefore be ready to resort to this form of financing only after having 
drawn upon the inside sources and bank credit9. 
  Following Fazzari-Hubbard-Petersen (1988, Fig. 1, p. 156) to 
illustrate the effects of the finance hierarchies on the financing and 
investment decisions made by firms we may for the sake of simplicity take 
the case of a representative firm that has three possible investment demand 
schedules, D0, D1, D2. Taking FO to indicate the inside sources (self-
financing) of the firm in question, if the investment demand stands at DO 
the firm will be able to finance the investment plan with inside sources, and 
is thus not subject to stringent financial constraints. If, on the other hand, 
demand stands at D1 or D2 the firm has no choice but to resort to outside 
sources. In the former case it will finance the investment first with inside 
sources and subsequently with bank credit, while in the latter case it will 
also fall back on the issue of shares. As we have seen, if the demand 
amounts to D1 or D2 the firm will have to bear a cost exceeding that of 
inside financing. 
  Thus the level of investment reached by the firm will depend on 
the extent of the inside sources and on whether or not it will have access to 
bank credit and the possibility of direct issue of shares, and the financial 
structure will indeed prove relevant to the investment decisions. 
 
 
2. The problems involved in financing innovation 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
goods in the property of the entrepreneur himself (cf. Berger-Udell, 1998).  
9From the empirical point of view Mayer (1990) demonstrates that in many industrialised 
  
  In this section, taking reference from recent contributions in the 
literature  we set out to emphasized that innovative firms are endowed with 
peculiar characteristics differentiating them from firms working in the 
traditional sectors and calling for reformulation of the hierarchy of finance 
sources considered in the previous section. 
  The first observation to make with regard to the innovative firms 
has to do with the fact that the financial requirements and degree of risk10 
often depend on the stage of development reached with the investment plan. 
Basically, we can distinguish four different stages: seed (conception of the 
innovative idea), start-up (starting on the innovative process), early growth 
(initial stage of expansion), sustained growth (consolidation stage). 
  During the embryonic stage (seed) the degree of risk that the 
innovative process may prove unsuccessful is indeed high, while the 
financial requirement is decidedly modest, often being limited by the 
expenditure involved in assessing the feasibility and economic expediency 
of the plan. The subsequent stage (start-up) still holds a fairly high degree 
of risk, on top of which is the need for substantial financial sources to 
create the prototypes and cover the costs of marketing and promotion. The 
stages of early growth and sustained growth hold rather less risk than the 
previous two stages, and are differentiated between themselves by the fact 
that, unlike the sustained growth stage, the period of early growth still 
entails fairly sizeable financial requirements. In fact, to provide for growth 
the firm has to develop sufficiently widespread distribution and marketing 
for the product. To put it in a few words, the phases calling for financing 
are in particular, then, the start-up and early growth stages of the innovative 
project, while it is the seed and start-up stages that show the highest degrees 
of risk.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
countries firms are unlikely to resort to this way of collecting funds.  
10Distinction is mad between economic and financial risks (Petrella, 2001). The former 
have to do with the probability of failure for the innovative project (pure technological 
risk), or the eventuality that the investment may prove obsolete on completion (temporal 
risk), or, finally, the possibility that the project will not meet with success on the market; 
the latter are connected with the economic risks and lie in the difficulty of quantifying the 
amount and temporal profile of the financial flows. 
  Turning back, now to the sources of financing considered in the 
previous section, the first point that strikes us is that resort to inside sources 
(self-financing) is hardly very likely for firms of this type, for they are 
simply not equipped to generate sufficient cash flows, above all in the early 
stages of development. Thus the innovative firms are markedly speculative 
agents in that they may well find themselves bearing liabilities (above all in 
the start-up stage) in excess of the expected future income flow. 
  As far as access to outside sources is concerned, assessment of the 
project by investors-financers appears to be characterised by a considerable 
degree of uncertainty (Hart, 2001), decidedly higher than for the firms 
operating in  the traditional sectors, and this makes screening a particularly 
challenging task for the outsiders. Innovative firms are by definition young 
firms, which makes it hard to weigh up the risk involved in possible 
financing. The fact that these firms can show no track record to lighten the 
information problem means a greater degree of information opacity11 than 
is met with in the traditional firms. This means that the agency costs are 
above average, and could even prove prohibitive for such firms. One 
solution to the problem of information asymmetry might be to convey all 
the information about the innovative investment project – in its entirety – to 
the investor-financer. In this case, however, the entrepreneur-innovator 
would lose his or her competitive advantage, which is enough to make the 
perfect transparency between insiders e outsiders highly dubious: in fact, 
an innovative project loses in value as information about it finds growing 
circulation (Bhattacharya-Chiesa,1995; Anton-Yao, 1998). 
  Quite often the innovative firms are not even in a condition to be 
able to offer sufficient guarantees, whether implicit or explicit, to alleviate 
the creditor’s risk, as illustrated in the previous section. As far as the 
implicit guarantees are concerned, in the initial stages, at least, these firms 
are unable to generate the positive net flows necessary to service the debt 
(pledgeable income) while, in terms of explicit guarantees, these firms use 
immaterial12 (patents, copyrights etc.) and/or particularly firm specific 
                                                          
11Although, as we shall see, the degree of information opacity depends on the degree of 
development reached by the firm. 
12In this case, too, the use of intangible assets is characteristic above all of the seed stage. 
In fact, as the innovative firm develops we may reasonably suppose that the physical 
assets, all of which adds up to greater risk for the potential financer (Hall, 
2002; Gompers, 1995). The immateriality of the capital can constitute a 
severe limitation to bank credit precisely because it leaves the firm with 
relatively little of the inside collaterals that would lighten the cost of 
bankruptcy, and thus the risk for the creditor.  On the other hand, the 
specificity in knowledge and use of capital goods increases their illiquidity, 
and again this means heavier bankruptcy costs for the creditor should 
financial distress arise, depriving him of the possibility to set a lower limit 
to loss should the project fail. The fact that no perfect resale market exists 
for such assets means that investment decisions and the consequent 
financial liabilities prove totally irreversible. 
  Thus a great deal of uncertainty and information opacity on the 
one hand, and the lack of collaterals and pledgeable income on the other 
can make it quite impossible for these firms to resort to the ‘traditional’ 
outside sources of financing, severely limiting their capacity to obtain 
financing with credit (Guiso, 1997) or with issue of shares.13 Moreover, in 
the initial (seed) phases it is above all human capital that the innovative 
firms hold14: the initial investment often consists in outlay for the salaries 
of the technical-scientific staff. This means high costs for capital stock 
adjustment, leading in turn to a higher cost of capital. 
  Thus the peculiar characteristics of innovative firms are such as to 
imply a situation of market failure as far as use of the traditional financing 
tools is concerned. Indeed, in this case Bronwyn Hall (2002) spoke of a 
missing market for the financing of innovation. 
 
 
  3. The role and effects of venture capital 
 
  One possible solution to the problem discussed in the second 
section lies in the idea of private equity,15 which is a matter of risk-capital 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
capital grows along with the human capital. 
13In practice both credit rationing and share rationing are at work here. 
14See in this connection: Audretsch-Lehmann, (2002) and Hall (2002). 
15Distinction is made between the organized private equity market and the informal private 
equity market. VC belongs to the former, while, as we shall see, angel finance and the 
informal financing by the entrepreneur-innovator’s family belongs to the latter. 
investment in unquoted firms. Venture capital (VC) belongs to this 
category, and takes the form of an intermediary collecting financing from a 
group of investors (banks, pension funds, insurance companies and 
foundations) and investing it in the share capital of newly instituted, highly 
innovative firms16.  
  This is a form of financing that comes under the heading of 
informed capital, as it is called, in contrast with arm’s length financing, 
which consists in collecting funds with the issue of shares and bonds 
directly traded on the open market.  
  In the first place the venture capitalist attends to the screening of 
the innovative firms, so as to reduce the degree of information asymmetry 
existing ex-ante. In fact, the intermediary is often in possession of specific 
technical competence which improves as his work of mediation grows, 
allowing for a shrewder selection of projects than normally made by a 
generic outside investor-financer or a bank (Ueda, 2000). Moreover, by 
granting risk-capital the venture-capitalist not only has the possibility of 
appropriating part of the value generated by the firm but can also perform 
various, very particular functions ranging from managerial consultancy to 
monitoring and even control of the venture-backed firm. As intermediary 
the venture-capitalist carries out the vital activity of information 
production, generally performed by the banks in the case of firms operating 
in the traditional sectors. Thus the venture-capitalist not only has the 
function of financing in the strict sense, but also provides services that are 
not strictly financial but which prove fundamental17 in the case of 
innovative firms, above all in the early stages of development.   
 As for the consultancy function, the intermediary often assists the 
financed firm in the work of management, organisation, marketing and even 
in taking strategic decisions. It often happens, in fact, that the entrepreneur-
innovator has all the technical-scientific knowledge at his fingertips, but 
lacks in managerial competence. Of course, the contribution in the form of 
consultancy is conditioned by the level of professionalism, experience and 
competence achieved by the venture capital managers. De Carvalho-
                                                          
16Such is the definition supplied by EVCA (European Venture Capital Association). 
17According to Lerner (1995) in the case of venture capital financing, the non-financial 
Calomiris- De Matos (2005), for example, showed that venture capitalists 
add value to portfolio firms by obtaining and transferring information about 
senior managers across firms over time. 
Furthermore, since the venture-capitalist has invested risk-capital in the 
innovative firm he will also have a strong incentive to engage in the activity 
of delegated monitoring. Direct monitoring provides the intermediary with 
the possibility to reduce the degree of ex-post information asymmetry and 
the associated problem of moral hazard on the part of the entrepreneur-
innovator.18 For example, in the case of firms operating in the sector of 
biotechnologies, the typical moral hazard arises when the researcher-
innovator might yield to the temptation to invest in research projects that 
enhance his or her reputation in the scientific community, but which are 
extremely or offer the investor lower returns than other possible projects.  
  Implementation of this function often has the venture capitalist 
sitting on the innovative firm’s board of directors19; in other words, it 
means loss of controlling power for the entrepreneur-innovator, necessary, 
however, at this point to prevent opportunistic and/or myopic behaviours 
that could lead the innovative project itself to failure. It is in any case a 
temporary loss of control since, as we shall see in section 4, a sort of 
implicit contract (cf. Black-Gilson, 1998) comes into being between the 
venture capitalist and the entrepreneur-innovator, on the basis of which the 
latter will be able to regain control when the time for disinvestment arrives 
with an IPO (Initial Public Offering). Thus venture capital financing takes 
on a hybrid form, in the sense that although it is characterised by 
investment in risk-capital it also shows certain features suggestive of debt 
capital.20 In fact, if the performance of the venture-backed firm is 
unsatisfactory, since it would increase the probability of moral hazard on 
the part of the innovator and thus the risk of loss for the investor, it is 
usually determined that the entire controlling power passes into the hands 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
contribution actually proves more important than the financial contribution. 
18In fact, the possibility of moral hazard increases as the inside collaterals and/or inside 
resources decrease. Thus it is more likely in the case of innovative firms (Aghion-
Bolton,1992; Audretsch-Lehamann, 2002).  
19The control exercised by the venture capitalist is, according to Black and Gilson (1998), 
often out of all proportion with respect to the share holding.  
20The observation is taken up by Hall (2002), who defines VC as a hybrid form of 
debt/equity. 
of the intermediary, allowing even for the project itself to be sold off (just 
as happens with the use of debt capital in cases of insolvency). If, on the 
other hand, the firm’s performance proves positive, then controlling power 
remains with or returns to the entrepreneur-innovator21. 
  A peculiar characteristic associated with VC, which is taking on 
increasing importance in the literature on contracts and efficient forms of 
control, is also to be seen in the system of financing in stages (staging), 
made to depend on the results achieved by the entrepreneurs-innovators 
(Gompers, 1995; Hart, 2001; Kaplan-Stromberg, 2000, 2002). Often, in 
fact, the initial financing made by the venture capitalist is far from 
sufficient to cover implementation of the business plan, thus providing the 
entrepreneur with a powerful incentive to make a success of the innovative 
project. Along with staging financing the venture capitalist often receives 
convertible bonds in return for participation in the social capital22. Again, 
this constitutes an operating strategy that gives the entrepreneur-innovator 
an incentive to pursue the set objectives: in this case, in fact, conversion 
usually proves automatic.  
  As for the function of information production, the venture 
capitalist is often clearly staking his reputation in guaranteeing the 
innovative project, thereby enhancing transparency vis-à-vis the venture 
backed. This means that the informed capital function thus performed can 
have positive indirect effects for third parties, who in turn increase their 
information on the firm and favour the success of the investment. For the 
suppliers the fact that financing is obtained through VC signals the 
soundness of the project, which encourages further provision of business 
credit. As for the clients, they could be confident that the innovative firm 
would be able to promote new products in a relatively short space of time; 
once the activity of the venture capitalist has alleviated the information 
problems, the banks might well be ready to grant loans; and, finally, the 
                                                          
21This proves and optimal form of financing in the case of incomplete contracts (Hart, 
2001), since it allows for the possibility to define a priori the process that will be involved 
in the power of control over future decisions. In fact, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) 
demonstrate that, should worst states and thus low profits result, it is preferable to hand 
control over to the VC (in this case more risk-averse), while in the case of good states and 
thus high profits it is better for control to be exercised by the entrepreneur-innovator (who 
is less risk-averse). 
22In this case, too, venture capital financing shows hybrid debt/equity features. 
venture-backed firm could be facilitated in finding subscribers in the case 
of an IPO (Lerner, 1994; Black-Gilson, 1998)23. As in the case of finance 
staging discussed above, this function, too, which is not strictly financial 
(reputational capital) is often conditioned and split so that an incentives 
compatibility constraint is respected in the action of the entrepreneur-
innovator. 
 
 
4. The new pecking order for innovative firms 
 
In the previous section we saw how venture capital financing actually 
offers a way to overcome the problem of market failure for the financing of 
innovative firms. Nevertheless, although VC enhances the efficiency of the 
financial system, it is not suitable if the projects to be financed are at the 
embryonic (seed) stage, and/or call for limited financial resources.24 This 
happens when there are marked scale diseconomies of in the management 
and monitoring (small ticket problem) which discourage venture capital 
financing. Moreover, as we saw in the previous section this entails the 
possibility of rapid disinvestment through IPO: the firms that have 
advanced beyond the start-up and early growth stages, and are thus at the 
stage of sustained growth, must of necessity look to other forms of 
financing (credit, issue of shares and bonds). Thus, in the case of innovative 
firms, too, despite the fundamental role played by VC, there is still a 
hierarchy in the sources of financing. This hierarchy will depend on the 
sizes of the firms, but above all on the various stages of development to 
which correspond different degrees of information opacity and financial 
requirement: it is a matter of what is known as the financial growth cycle 
(Berger-Udell,1998). 
  On the basis of the financial growth cycle, before turning to the 
organized private equity market (which includes VC financing), the 
                                                          
23During placement the function of intermediary agents is provided for to act as sponsors; 
suffice it to mention such figures as nominated advisors, designated sponsors etc. (cf. 
Petrella, 2001, p. 15). 
24In order to analyse the financial hierarchies, together with the stage of development it is 
also important to consider the size (small-medium-large) of the innovative firms (Berger-
Udell, 1998). 
innovative firm resorts to two “informal” forms of financing: a) insider 
financing (Avery-Bostic-Samolyk, 1998), or in other words use of the 
capital in the possession of the entrepreneur-innovator and/or members of 
his or her family; b) angel finance (Lerner, 1998). While the outlay of 
resources by the entrepreneur himself and/or members of the family25 
characterises above all the seed stage, angel finance is among the possible 
resources for the subsequent stage of development (start-up). Angel finance 
consists of direct (non-mediated)26 provision of risk-capital in the early 
stages of innovative projects calling for limited financial resources. More 
often than not it is a matter of affluent entrepreneurs, still active or retired, 
who have no parental ties with the innovator and are looking to diversify 
their wealth (cf. Petrella, 2001).  
  At the seed stage of the innovative project there are also two forms 
of easy-term  public financing that are taking on increasing importance, 
above all for the small-size firms. Suffice it here to recall SBIR (Small 
Business Innovation Research) and SBIC (Small Business Investment 
Company) in the USA27, the ETF (European Technology Facility), I-TEC 
(Innovation and Technology Equity Capital) and LIFT (Linking Innovation, 
Finance and Technology) in the European Union. The effects that can 
derive from easy-term public financing are both direct and indirect, and 
have come under the scrutiny of various authors (David-Hall-Toole, 2000; 
Klette-Moen-Griliches, 2000). In an empirical analysis Lerner (1999) 
demonstrates, in particular, that firms having access to this finance channel 
show the fastest growth due largely to the “quality certification”, thanks to 
which they are subsequently able to obtain further funds on the market. 
  Continuing with our analysis of financial hierarchies, we observe 
that, given the peculiar characteristics of the innovative firms discussed in 
section 2, VC as a form of private equity generally proves to be the source 
the entrepreneur-innovator draws upon after having resorted to the three 
                                                          
25In the case of small innovative firms the entrepreneur in need of financing may even be 
driven to give in guarantee assets of his own or his family’s property: in this case he is 
resorting to forms of outside collateral, since he is tying up assets that are not the property 
of the firm. 
26Reference is made to the informal private equity market (Berger-Udell, 1998). 
27 Taken together, in 1995 SBIR and SBIC supplied 2.4 billion US dollars,  60% more than 
the VC financing of that year. 
sources mentioned above, but before drawing on credit. The traditional 
hierarchy considered in section 1, which sees the use of debt capital 
preferred to risk-capital is in fact perfectly inverted in the case of the 
innovative firms. The innovative firms can resort to bank financing only 
after obtaining resources through VC, and this applies regardless of the size 
of the firms. If they are to be able to draw upon credit it is also necessary 
for the immateriality of the capital assets employed to be reduced, as well 
as the information opacity (Berger-Udell, 1998). 
  More in particular, from the point of view of the financial 
hierarchies the financing growth cycle shows that VC financing proves the 
most appropriate source above all for the start-up stage28, characterised as it 
is by the need for substantial resources and a degree of information 
asymmetry and risk that remains high, although not so high as in the 
previous seed stage. 
  Thanks to the action of the venture capitalist as producer of 
information, the innovative firm sees its opacity steadily clearing, which 
opens the way to other forms of financing. However, in order that the 
financing of innovation prove optimal the need is that there be, alongside 
VC, a second, efficient and transparent market29 allowing for the unfreezing 
of the capital invested via the IPO exit. Between the VC action and the 
presence of a share market facilitating the quotation of innovative firms 
there are, in fact, synergies at work, and with them a close relation of 
complementarity. The fact that VC can bring the firms to quotation quite 
rapidly means that the successful entrepreneurs have the option to reacquire 
control, while VC can release “expert” capital for the financing of new 
projects (Black-Gilson, 1998). The shortage of venture capitalists is due to 
the shadow cost of dealing with a particular company compared with a new 
profitable project. For Jovanovic-Szentes (2007) this may explain why VC-
backed firms reach IPO earlier than other start-ups and why they are more 
                                                          
28This applies above all in the USA, while in Europe venture capital financing can also be 
used for firms in the early growth stage (Hall, 2002) 
29With the precise aim of fostering the diffusion of venture capital, in many European 
countries a great many new securities markets have emerged for innovative firms: suffice 
it to mention the Nouveau Marché of the French Bourse; the Mew Market of the Italian 
Borsa; the alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange; Easdaq; the Neur 
Markt of the Deutsche Borse, etc. 
worth. The price discovery role played by VC provides agents with further 
signals that can help in assessment of the innovative firms and facilitate the 
subsequent business credit by suppliers or bank financing30.  
  As for public equity and the issue of bonds, they prove viable 
when the degree of information opacity and risk has been appreciably 
lowered and the firm has established a sound reputation. We may 
summarise by saying that the pecking order for innovative firms sees the 
sources in the following order (Fig. 2): 1) insider capital, informal private 
equity and easy-term public financing (SEED); 2) venture capital financing 
(START-UP); 3) self-financing, bank and/or business credit; (EARLY-
GROWTH); 4) direct issue of bonds and  public equity (SUSTAINED-
GROWTH). 
  Between the various forms of financing, moreover, there are 
interconnections giving rise to complementarity or substitutability between 
the sources. There is clearly a close relation between venture capital 
financing and the New Markets, as mentioned above. The fact that angel 
financing precedes the use of VC is in turn indicative of the fact that these 
two finance channels are complementary. As for business and bank credit, 
they can be seen as substitutes. Actually, recourse to business credit 
depends negatively on the degree of relations firms have with their banks. 
As we have seen, the financial structure of the firm can also condition the 
future cost and the availability of other sources of financing (Myers, 2001), 
and so the degree of growth the firms achieve: obtaining a credit contract 
may raise the price of shares and favours access to public equity. 
 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
  When the environment considered is one characterised by 
imperfect, asymmetric information on the capital market between 
managers-entrepreneurs (insiders) and financers-investors (outsiders), the 
                                                          
30From the macroeconomic point of view, this can start off a pro-cyclic process, driving 
towards a stage of boom. 
M-M theorem – arguing the total irrelevance of financial structure to 
investment decisions – proves groundless. In fact, beginning with the 
contribution by Myers (1984), a substantial part of corporate finance 
literature has demonstrated that the sources of financing are not perfectly 
substitutable among themselves, but rather that a positive financial 
hierarchy (pecking order) applies, which sees insider sources preferred to 
credit, and the latter preferred to the direct issue of shares.  
  Nevertheless, as we have sought to show in this paper, the pecking 
order comes up for reconsideration if examination extends to the financing 
of innovative firms. These are young firms, often on a small scale, using 
mainly immaterial and/or firm-specific assets and in the early stages of 
development (seed and start-up) are unable to generate financial flows 
sufficient to service debt. These characteristics, together with an above-
average degree of information opacity, can imply equity rationing or credit 
rationing should the traditional sources of financing (credit or issues of 
shares) be used. This flaw of inefficiency in the financial system – 
innovative projects with positive net current value risk not being financed – 
has in part been remedied with the introduction and development of VC. 
Venture capital appears as a hybrid form of financing: it consists in 
investment in risk-capital, but is also characterised by the function of 
intermediation performed by the venture capitalist. Over and above the 
traditional activities of screening and monitoring, with venture capital 
financing it is also possible to allocate power of control over decisions 
(Kaplan-Stromberg, 2000, 2002), depending on the performance of the 
venture-backed firm. In this way VC succeeds in reconciling the points of 
force at work in the market-centred financial system with those of the bank-
centred system (Black-Gilson, 1998; Rajan-Zingales, 2001). As we have 
sought to demonstrate, however, this does not mean that venture capital 
financing is the answer to all the problems involved in the financing of 
innovative firms (Hall, 2002). 
  In fact, given the considerable scale diseconomies involved in the 
management and monitoring of the firms resort to VC is not the solution if 
the projects to be financed are in the seed stage and/or call for limited 
financial resources. In such cases innovative firms look to insider 
financing, angel finance or easy-term public finance (SBIR, ETF etc.). 
Thus, as we have been at pains to point out in this paper, a pecking order 
still applies in the case of innovative firms, too. More specifically, in the 
light of the financial growth cycle approach proposed by Berger and Udell 
(which shows how the optimal financial structure will depend on the degree 
of development achieved by the firm) we have seen that for innovative 
firms, unlike the traditional firms, risk capital precedes debt capital in the 
pecking order. It is only when VC has already performed its function of 
information production and reduced the degree of information opacity that 
the innovative firm can turn to bank credit. For venture capital to be able to 
develop its activity it is also necessary, as we learn from experience in the 
USA and the introduction of New Markets in Europe, for a transparent and 
efficient second market to be a work, able to ease the process of 
disinvestment and set the favour the venture capital cycle in motion once 
again (Gompers-Lerner, 2001). 
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FIG. 1 
 
 
Pecking order financing and investment for traditional firms (see: Fazzari-Hubbard-
Petersen, 1988; Hall, 2002) 
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New Pecking Order for Innovative Firms  
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